Ramseys 1923 Induction: Keynes and Wittgenstein, Paralyzed the Study of Keynes’s Theory of Logical Probability for Over 100 Years
Author(s):
Michael Emmett Brady
Ramsey’s severe confusions, based on his ruminations and musings about the logical foundations for Keynes’s relational, propositional logic, led him to come to the bizarre conclusion that Keynes ‘s premises and conclusions, contained in Keynes’s Boolean, relational, propositional logic were somehow tied together with Plato’s metaphysical relations based on Plato’s theory of forms. How Ramsey came to this conclusion was based on his creation in his mind of a false analogy between Moore’s discussions of the Good, which were tied to Plato, with Keynes’s discussions of probability, which have nothing to do with Plato. This is easily discerned because there is no mention made by Keynes of Plato, Platonic forms, Platonic entities, Platonic relations, Platonism, or Neo Platonism anywhere in the text of the A Treatise on Probability, bibliography or index. Ramsey’s false analogy is presented in his 1923 paper, “Induction: Keynes and Wittgenstein”.
Anyone, who had actually read Keynes’s book, would have to have concluded that Keynes’s relational, propositional logic is based only on G. Boole’s earlier relational, propositional logic as put forth in 1854.Plato’s theory of forms has no developed logic of propositions.
The great mystery then, that has to be confronted in academia in the year 2024, is how was it possible for academicians for over 100 years to have accepted Ramsey’s claims, made without a shred of evidence based on any citations to Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability? Apparently, for over 100 years, academicians have been accepting Ramsey’s assessments of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability without any citations to any pages of Keynes’s book to back up Ramsey’s claims.
